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BOOK REVIEW

Terrorism Financing: The Rise and Fall of Counter‐Terrorism
Policy Primacy†
Reviewed by Jonathan Vollinger
ABSTRACT
Throughout this review I will offer a critique of the book in several forms.
In addition to the general synopses of the viewpoints expounded throughout the
book, I insert my own opinions which corroborate, and, in a few cases, contradict
the opinions of the authors. For the most part, as this is a book review, I will
critique the main author’s (Giraldo) strategy, recommendations, and of course,
her success or failure in her attempts to achieve her stated goal: a
comprehensive assessment of the nature of terrorism financing, government
responses, and the efficacy of both. However, the structure of State Responses
makes it necessary to also summarize and critique the individual contributions as
well. Because we are approaching four years since the inception of State
Responses, I make an effort to scrutinize the accuracy, or lack thereof, of any
predictions made by the contributors.
Part I is an overview of the nature of the terrorist threat. In doing so, the
authors employ political economy and rational choice approaches to
understanding the sources of funding networks within terrorist organizations.
This section further previews the key debates surrounding counter‐terrorism
policy and advocates a greater degree of focus on intelligence‐based strategies.
Part II, through case studies, conducts a comparative survey of terrorist financing
and government responses to the development of the Taliban and al Qaeda
terrorist organizations. This section argues that even highly motivated states
face obstacles in their attempt to stifle terrorist finances. It highlights U.S.
responses to terrorist financing and attempts to explain the shortcomings of
these measures. Part III assesses the legal implications of CTF policies. This
section explains how State Responses fell short in its address of the human rights
and civil liberties issues which have stifled international cooperation. Finally, Part
IV concludes my Review.

†

A book review of TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES. By Jeanne K. Giraldo.
Stanford, C.A.: Stanford Univ. Press. 2007. Pp. ix, 296.

J.D., University of Miami School of Law, May 2012.
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As an aside, it is worth noting that my Review does not analyze each of
the contributions contained within State Responses. Rather, I have carefully
chosen the articles which, in my opinion, highlight the overarching issues
surrounding terrorism finance—leaving out, for example, issues such as
organized crime and warning indicators. Likewise, with respect to case studies, I
have chosen to address areas which have received the majority of publicity by
the U.S. media—namely the Taliban and Al Qaeda financing efforts, and of
course, the United States response.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, extensive resources
have been devoted to the study of terrorism financing. What has been found, as
expected, is that financial resources are the crux of terrorist operations both
domestically and abroad. Thus, much has been made of the importance of
combating the financial infrastructure of terrorist organizations internationally.
Much has also been written on the subject. The advancement of the present
volume is a significant contribution in the area of counter‐terrorist finance.1 It is
a collaboration of articles and case studies by experts who, together, represent a
comprehensive network of authority in the area of national security affairs.
Through the coalescence of these authors, Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A.
Trinkunas—in Terrorism Financing and State Responses (hereinafter “State
Responses”)—seek to provide a thorough analysis of our current understanding
of terrorism financing. This analysis is juxtaposed with a synopsis of
governmental responses to the problem of terrorism financing.
The motivation behind this book is simple: in order to understand the
battle against terrorist financing, we must take an evaluation of the overall state
of affairs. In order to do so, we must evaluate recent literature in this area,
address preconceived illusions which have developed around the issue, and
gauge the current policy debates. Upon doing so, we can then have a better
measure of our success in this fight against terrorism finance. In the author’s
own words, the thrust of the book is this: “It argues that both terrorism financing
and government responses face problems of coordination, oversight, and
information asymmetries that render them vulnerable to disruption.”2
State Responses is the result of the conference Terrorism Financing and
State Responses in Comparative Perspective, held in November 2004 at the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Editor Jeanne Giraldo is the
Program Manager for the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, a new Office of
the Secretary of Defense initiative. She also teaches in the National Security
Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. Her co‐editor, Dr. Harold
Trinkunas, is an Associate Professor and Chair in the Department of National
Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. Trinkunas received his PhD in
Political Science from Stanford University in 1999. Giraldo and Trinkunas were
the co‐organizers of the project Terrorism Financing and State Responses in a
Comparative Perspective. This volume is the product of those efforts.

1

TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Jeanne K. Giraldo
& Harold K. Trinkunas eds., 2007).
2
Id. at 2.
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The value of State Responses stems from its structure, rather than it’s
content. The book makes its greatest contribution to the debate surrounding
counter‐terrorist financing by allowing the reader to see the issues from
numerous perspectives. The compilation of contributions from various authors
highlights the major debates in this area; it also enables the reader to grasp the
debates from many perspectives. Overall, the book is an ambitious attempt to
give a thorough history of terrorism financing and an even deeper explanation of
government responses in this arena. However, the book’s focus on providing a
comprehensive historical overview severely limits its ability to advance the
debate beyond its current status. State Responses leads readers to deduce that
we know little about the effectiveness of counter‐terrorism financing
(hereinafter “CTF”) efforts, and even less about the future significance of these
efforts. Given this deduction, it is critical to explore the future of terrorism
financing, but the reader is left wanting in this regard. The absence of this
perspective is the book’s greatest weakness.
II. DEPICTING THE TERRORIST THREAT
A. The Political Economy of Terrorism Financing (Giraldo and Trinkunas)
The opening chapter of State Responses develops the nature of the
terrorist threat within a political economy framework.3 It is important to note
this chapter is co‐authored by the editors of State Responses, allowing readers to
analyze these initial viewpoints against which the remaining authors’ opinions
can be weighed. In fact, a large part of this Review is devoted to assessing these
opinions in light of any similar or divergent views by the other contributors.4 The
authors develop a political economy framework, which analyses the various
actors within terrorist organizations as a way of showing how funding sources
influence the behavior of these groups. This approach leads the authors to the
conclusion that conventional wisdom about terrorist financing exaggerates the
efficiency and effectiveness of these efforts.5 This argument stems from the idea
that while state sponsorship of terrorist organizations has historically limited
financing efforts, “new terrorist”6 groups are becoming less constrained due to
the rise of a financial model in which terrorists are becoming increasingly self‐

3

Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas, The Political Economy of Terrorism Financing,
in TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 7, 11 (Jeanne K.
Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007).
4
The book is formulated as a comparative perspective. It is a collection of works from
experts in the field, many of which make similar arguments, while others diverge. My
argument is that this structure is the book’s key strength, so an analysis of these works
respective of each other is essential.
5
GIRALDO & TRINKUNAS, supra note 3, at 19.
6
Id. at 7.
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sufficient.7 In sum, terrorists are bypassing state funding in search of other
funding sources.
What proceeds from this is the obvious deduction that terrorism
financing is driven more so by the availability of alternative funding than by a
lack of state sponsorship.8 A fair point is made by the argument that the growing
deadliness of new terrorism is the product of the diversification of funding
sources and the declining importance of state support. This point dispels the
myth that states are the ultimate financiers of terrorism and highlights a critical
reason why curtailing terrorist financing has become more difficult in recent
decades.
However, the authors undermine to some degree the fundamental
concept of terrorism. It seems contradictory to suggest CTF agencies avoid
overestimating the capabilities of terrorists, while also noting the increase in the
lethality of such attacks.9 How can we question the effectiveness of terrorists’
efforts when they continue to be successful? Traditional notions of terrorism by
definition make it incapable of overestimation. It is a bit counterintuitive: the
overarching theme of the book is the explanation of why state responses have
proven largely ineffective, yet the authors insinuate that we have somehow
overestimated our adversary. If terrorists are becoming increasingly resourceful
in their search for funding, and the deadliness of attacks continues to intensify, it
would seem to reason they are becoming more efficient, not less so.
In the authors’ defense, the confusion seems to be more a product of the
wording than an actual conceptual miscalculation. To suggest that we have
exaggerated the “efficiency” and “effectiveness” of terrorists financing leads the
reader to believe CTF tactics have been unsuccessful.10 However, the authors use
these words to say the opposite—that while globalization has forced terrorists to
adapt, making government measures more difficult to implement, it also creates
opportunities for these governments because terrorists have become more
vulnerable.11 It is proposed as a recommendation that is repeated subsequently
throughout the book: the need to develop a realistic view of the terrorist threat.
Unfortunately, it is phrased in a manner which diverts its intended message. It is
a small misstep at an inopportune time. The reader closes the opening chapter
with a disparaged view of the threat, not in sync with the remainder of the book
and certainly not the intended result.

7

Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
9
Id. at 19.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 20.
8
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As noted previously, my one qualm with this piece is found in the final
line, when the authors caution agencies to “[A]void overestimating the power,
flexibility, and capabilities of the groups.”12 While the authors’ point is well
taken, it is formulated in such a manner to create confusion. The lay reader is
likely to find the above suggestions perplexing in light of the fact that only a few
sentences prior the authors note the increasing ease with which globalization
has enabled terrorists to organize funding. Overall, this piece stands for the
proposition that the challenges facing governments has become greater due to
the onset of globalization in the wake of the Cold War. The stage is thus
sufficiently set for the remainder of the book to explain the successes and
failures of government responses.
B. Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas (Nikos Passas)
Similar to the previous article by Giraldo and Trinkunas, the commentary
by Nikos Passas argues that the effectiveness of financial controls is limited.
Passas suggests that imprudent expectations can not only be ineffective, but also
highly counterproductive.13 Furthermore, the misapplication of these controls
can have the same effect, causing more harm than good.14 Passas argues that
rather than focusing on unrealistic goals, governments should monitor terrorists
from a social context in order to better track and predict shifting preferences.15
The key divergence from Giraldo and Trinkunas, however, is that Passas
advocates the realization that CTF measures are inherently limited in their
effectiveness, whereas the former advocate the recognition that terrorists are
themselves limited in their capabilities. This difference makes Passas’
contribution significant. Rather than demeaning the capacity of our opposition,
Passas believes we should accept the situation for what it is and adjust our
policies accordingly. This is not to say the former commentary failed to credit the
accomplishments of terrorist organizations; but rather, by focusing on our own
inefficiencies, the immediate score advances the debate towards a groupthink
resolution to the problem.
Through the use of numerical figures, Passas is able to generate a
cognizable threat. He notes that the 9/11 attacks are estimated to have cost as
little as $350,000; such petty sums simply cannot be controlled effectively.16 A
12

Id.
Nikos Passas, Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas, in TERRORISM
FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21, 22 (Jeanne K. Giraldo &
Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007).
14
Id.
15
Id. at 23.
16
Id. at 33.
13
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major point of his piece is that our knowledge of terrorist financing is trivial at
best. Without better knowledge of the threat, he asks, how can we prevent it?
For this reason, I find this piece to be one of the better contributions in State
Responses. It highlights the reality of our limited knowledge in this area and
dispels any beliefs to the contrary. The reality here is that terrorism is cheap, and
as long as this continues to be true, small amounts of financing will always be
available to fuel terrorist motivations.17
Potentially even more edifying and especially pertinent to this Review,
Passas says “[W]e have been fighting terror with error. . . .” 18 From a legal
perspective, the U.S. has undermined the legitimacy of its efforts by taking
measures prematurely. This lack of due process has caused a hesitancy to
cooperate from other nations.19 This cooperation is essential to effective
counter‐terrorist financing efforts. In this respect we have been our own
greatest enemy. As Passas so eloquently articulates, “We cannot defend
democracy, human rights, and due process by undermining them at home or
internationally.”20 The debate on requisite due process for suspected terrorists
still rages. The military commissions have been compared to the Nuremberg
trials of Nazi war criminals following World War II, in which defendants we given
limited due process.21 The debate has been polarized such that compromise has
been an arduous process. Passas thus points out an important aspect of the
battle against terrorism, which is that the effectiveness of government responses
is severely limited as long as opposing sides do not converge.
Viewed in the context of the volume as a whole, Passas offers a
distinctive complement to the opening chapter. His excerpt underlines the
incompleteness of our knowledge with respect to the nature of terrorist funding.
It further emphasizes the discrepancies amongst the international community
regarding proposed courses of actions. It is also the first of many pieces to stress
the need to facilitate greater international cooperation, which Passas believes is
impossible if we continue to violate human rights in our efforts. His key thrust is
the avoidance of counterproductive policies, which serves as a nice counterpart
to the previous piece which recognizes the need to make a realistic assessment
of the threat. Thus, his contribution effectively builds upon the previous, helping
the reader further understand the complete picture.

17

Id. at 37.
Id.
19
Id. at 36.
20
Id. at 37.
21
Jeffrey Rosen, A Terror Trial, With or Without Due Process, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/weekinreview/10rosen.html.
18
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C. Terrorist Organizations’ Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies: A Rational
Choice Perspective (Jacob Shapiro)

Shapiro’s ideas share some similarities, albeit some differences with the
first two pieces. Similar to the first excerpt is the idea that terrorist organizations
are inefficient in their funding strategies. However, in contrast to the political
economy framework22, his principal‐agent framework is more easily relatable,
and thus more understandable to readers. In what he deems a “rational choice
perspective,” Shapiro describes a moral hazard situation created by the need for
leaders (principals) to delegate fundraising to middlemen (agents).23 Essentially,
he argues that terrorists face a security‐efficiency tradeoff created by this
problem of moral hazard which arises when funds are scarce.24 Shapiro
concludes that governments can exploit this tradeoff. By restricting finances,
terrorists are forced to choose between security and efficiency. Choosing
efficiency exposes terrorist vulnerabilities. Choosing security means fewer
operations.25
Unlike Giraldo and Trinkunas, Shapiro suggests these inefficiencies are
not necessarily the result of globalization and decreasing state sponsorship.
Instead, they must be brought about by government intervention.26 This is what
he means by rational choice: when governments restrict terrorist finances,
terrorist leaders must make a choice between efficiency and security. Regardless
of which strategy they pursue, the government is better off because terrorist
leaders cannot pursue both options.27
While Shapiro’s views are to some degree analogous to those of Giraldo
and Trinkunas, they deviate significantly from Passas’ proposals. The key
difference lies in Shapiro’s advocacy of a proactive government approach.
Passas, on the other hand, advocates a reactive approach28, stressing the
importance of minimizing the adverse effects of government efforts. Instead of
taking proactive actions, Passas believes efforts should be focused on gathering
information on terrorist financing in order to facilitate monitoring and
anticipation of future terrorist movements. In this vein, Passas can be said to
advocate a passive strategy, whereas Shapiro recommends undertaking specific
(proactive) actions to place terrorist organizations on the defensive. This
22

GIRALDO & TRINKUNAS, supra note 3, at 11.
Jacob Shapiro, Terrorist Organizations’ Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies, in TERRORISM
FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 56, 58 (Jeanne K. Giraldo &
Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007).
24
Id. at 60.
25
Id. at 71.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
NIKOS PASSAS, supra note 13, at 37.
23
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distinction is arguably the principal reason for the inclusion of Shapiro’s work in
this volume. The debate over effective CTF policies is again furthered by
providing a unique perspective through Shapiro’s rational choice theory. State
Responses begins to take shape in its attempt to show why the global effort to
combat terrorism financing has met considerable resistance—a lack of
consensus over appropriate policy responses makes global cooperation largely
unworkable.
III. CASE STUDIES: A COMPARISON OF GLOBAL REGIMES
A. Rise of the Taliban and al Qaeda Coalitions
1. Financing Afghan Terrorism: Thugs, Drugs, and Creative
Movements of Money (Thomas H. Johnson)
The origins of Afghan terrorism, most easily identified with the Taliban,
are explained by Johnson through a historical context.29 He explains how
Afghanistan initially attracted extremists due to the fact that the country was in
continuous conflict for decades prior to the 1990s. This conflict and the
remoteness of the region provided a haven for extremists to train and base their
operations.30 Johnson makes an excellent point here, one that is not easily
ascertained by the American public: Afghanistan was a target of U.S. anti‐terror
efforts long before the attacks of 9/11.
Johnson begins by explaining the impetus behind Afghanistan’s
development as a hotbed for extremism, beginning with the Soviet Union’s
invasion in 1979. The invasion saw the influx of Muslim volunteers eager to aid
the Afghan resistance. It was deemed a “holy war,” or jihad, a term with which
many are now familiar. Among these volunteers was Osama bin Laden, originally
of Saudi Arabia. From his base in Afghanistan bin Laden was able to recruit
extremists from all over the Middle East. The withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989
led to the dispersion of Afghan extremists across the Middle East.31 More
importantly, they had been radicalized and unified by their defeat of the great
Soviet power. The defeat of Soviet imperialism spurned the belief that they
could do the same to U.S. imperialism.32

29

Thomas H. Johnson, Financing Afghan Terrorism: Thugs, Drugs, and Creative
Movements of Money, in TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 93, 94 (Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007).
30
Id. at 93.
31
Id. at 102.
32
Id. at 103.
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As Johnson explains, Afghan Arabs received funding during the Soviet
resistance. The funding continued after the Soviet withdrawal. So the growth of
Afghan terrorist financing began with the early insurgents against the Soviet
invasion, but developed into terrorist organizations connected to a transnational
jihadi network.33 Johnson’s contribution here is appreciated because it explains
how Afghanistan became a haven for terrorism, a history that is presumably not
readily known to the lay person. In fact, it seems a fair conclusion to say that
most Americans are not aware that Osama bin Laden is actually from Saudi
Arabia and only began his ties to Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion. In this
respect, Johnson’s historical overview is not exhaustive. It is informative and
entirely crucial to an understanding of Afghan terrorism.
Johnson makes another important contribution by explaining the
interconnectedness of the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorist organizations. As he
explains, the groups are distinct, but the differentiation between bin Laden and
the Taliban was blurred after 1996 due to their similar roles in the jihadi
network.34 Bin Laden and al Qaeda provided financial support to Afghanistan. In
return, bin Laden was allowed to move freely in his host state.35 The complex
relationships between the groups served to erode the distinction between the
two. Johnson’s description of bin Laden’s involvement with the Taliban enables
the reader to grasp the interrelatedness of the groups while also understanding
their differences.
Also of particular interest is what has been termed “blowback,”36 a term
used to refer to the unintended consequences of many states’—including the
U.S.—initial support of the mujahidin during the anti‐Soviet jihad.37 The
mujahidin were Muslim guerilla warriors fighting against the Soviet invasion.
Johnson describes how the U.S. funded the mujahidin with the hopes of forcing
the Soviets to withdraw in humiliation, turning Afghanistan into a Soviet
“Vietnam.”38 The U.S. used Pakistan to distribute aid to Afghanistan, who in turn
pursued their own interests. Johnson describes how the U.S. extended aid to the
mujahidin without first considering who they represented.39 Reminiscent of the
Passas article, the U.S. was its own greatest enemy. Through all our efforts to
stomp out terrorist financing, we may have once been a patron to its initial
growth—a catalyst in Afghan’s rapid rise to the forefront of Arab extremism.
33

Id. at 94.
Id. at 104.
35
MICHAEL SCHEUER, IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERRORISM 140‐41
(2004).
36
AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 198
(2001).
37
THOMAS H. JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 112.
38
Id.
39
Id.
34
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Overall, Johnson sheds light on many historical elements of the Afghan
terrorist network not readily apparent to most readers. Johnson’s most
important contributions are his underlining of Afghanistan’s rise as a
transnational haven for terrorist efforts after the Soviet invasion, the growing
affiliation of al Qaeda (founded in Pakistan by Osama bin Laden) and the Taliban
(originated in Afghanistan), and the development of Osama bin Laden as a
figurehead in the jihadi movement. In the wake of the recent Iraq War, it
emphasizes the importance of Afghanistan as an ongoing threat to American
freedom. Due to the potential for the reemergence of Afghanistan as a haven for
international terrorists, he stresses a continued focus on Afghanistan.40 Thus,
Johnson goes beyond offering a mere historical overview, making a practical
suggestion regarding the importance of securing the Afghan region going
forward.41
2. Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups (Victor
Comras)
As discussed in the previous article, the roots of al Qaeda’s financial
network trace directly to the recruiting and financing networks established to
support anti‐Soviet jihad activities in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. The
subsequent overthrow of the Taliban regime and the elimination of al Qaeda’s
bases in Afghanistan resulted in al Qaeda splintering into smaller, independent
cells responsible for their own funding.42 While the U.S. has made significant
headway, our efforts have been made more difficult because terrorist assets are
becoming increasingly difficult to trace. As the other authors have noted, the
adaptability of terrorist organizations has forced counter‐terrorism units to
reassess their strategies, creating an enduring chess match of sorts, each party
constantly reacting to the moves of the other.43
Comras suggests these difficulties have been furthered by shortcomings
in the way in which the asset‐freezing regime has been implemented.44 He
explains why countries are reluctant to provide governments with the names of
40

Id. at 114.
Contrary to other pieces, Johnson shows not only how the terrorist threat originated,
but why it remains a continuing threat. This contribution is thus significant as an outlier
to my argument that State Responses offers little in the way of forward‐looking thinking.
42
Victor Comras, Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups, in TERRORISM
FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 115, 116 (Jeanne K. Giraldo &
Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007).
43
The adaptability of terrorist organizations is a central theme of State Responses. It is
one of few underlying justifications throughout the book for why government responses
have largely failed to address the threat over the last decade.
44
VICTOR COMRAS, supra note 42, at 131.
41
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their residents, and thus how they have limited freezing actions to bank accounts
which are easily avoided by adept terrorists.45 Without the ability to reach past
these accounts, our impact is severely limited. To make matters worse, Comras
points out that the continuing Israeli‐Palestinian conflict and the Iraq War have
fostered recruitment for a new generation of al Qaeda‐related terrorist
factions.46
The chief premise of Comras’ article is that international cooperation
remains greatly insufficient to make any significant headway in the international
war on terror.47 Comras points out that most cooperation has taken place on a
strictly bilateral basis while multilateral cooperation has been limited.48 The lack
of multilateral cooperation leaves many known terrorist funding operatives free
to continue their financial support structures. The commentary of Comras makes
it clear that a priority must be placed on controlling terrorists groups globally by
keeping them separated and thereby limiting their ability to raise adequate
funds. The best way to do this is through international cooperation, which has
proven a slow road. This argument is akin to that of Nikos Passas, who urged
governments to avoid counterproductive policies49 which hinder, rather than
cultivate international cooperation.
Comras leads the reader to the conclusion that the adaptability of
contemporary terrorist organizations is a consequence of modern‐day warfare. It
is my opinion that this article’s best contribution is not its detailed discussion of
al Qaeda financing, but the realization that we are fighting a battle that cannot
be entirely won. The 20th century saw imperialistic world powers go head to
head for world domination. The modern era has ushered in a new kind of war—
the “war on terror.” The war on terror is not a battle against a fellow nation or
government; it is a battle against a group of insurgents committed to a cause.
This is the key distinction—terrorists have chosen to enlist in this war. They
believe in it, and it is for this reason the war on terror will not end at the hand of
a peace treaty: it will continue until the adversary loses its will to fight for its
beliefs. Arriving at this conclusion is by no means a necessary corollary to the
Comras’ article, but it certainly opens the door to a number of possible
suppositions.

45

Id.
Id. at 117.
47
Id. at 132. The notion of international cooperation, or lack thereof, has been a central
theme in State Responses.
48
Id.
49
NIKOS PASSAS, supra note 13, at 22.
46
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B. Domestic and International Responses to the Threat
1. Anti‐Terror Strategy, The 9/11 Commission Report, and
Terrorism Financing: Implications for U.S. Policy Makers
(Raphael Perl)
Perl does well in his explanation of the shift in U.S. strategy away from
the seizure of assets to the doctrine of preemption.50 He acknowledges that
these wars have never been won, and never will be won, by defensive
operations.51 Accordingly, U.S. anti‐terrorism strategy relies on the doctrine of
preemption, part of which involves targeting terrorist finances. In this respect,
Perl is similar to Comras in that they both promote a strategy involving proactive
efforts to create a web of international cooperation. A majority of the remainder
of the article focuses on the 9/11 Commission Report52 (hereinafter “The
Report”), highlighting policymakers’ inevitable realization that we must change
our strategy in order to combat terrorism financing.
Perl provides a sound background in U.S. anti‐terror strategy. He explains
the differences between the National Strategy for Homeland Security—which
focuses on attacks within the U.S.—and the National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, which focuses on defusing threats before they reach U.S. borders.53
The latter has an inherent preemptive component. Perl further explains the
concept of “defense‐in‐depth,” a plan founded on four pillars of defense—
defeat, deny, diminish, and defend.54 The key to this synopsis is the centrality of
law enforcement cooperation centered on international cooperation. The
priority on international cooperation remains a theme amongst the authors of
State Responses.
The above analysis is followed by an overview and critique of The Report.
Overall, The Report calls for redefining terrorist financing strategy goals away
50

“Preemption” in this context is the notion that governments should commence
proactive actions to rout terrorist funds before they materialize. Examples of
preemptive tactics are the Bush administration’s actions following 9/11, as well as the
American invasion of Iraq in the Iraq War.
51
Raphael Perl, Anti‐Terror Strategy, The 9/11 Commission Report, and Terrorism
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from a focus on seizing assets and towards a focus on gathering intelligence for
preemption purposes.55 In addition to these recommendations, The Report
advises continuing aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan, who The Report perceives to
be vital allies in the war on terror.56 This is an interesting concept given what
Thomas Johnson previously described as “blowback,” noting the
acknowledgment of the consequences of aid to these nations prior to 9/11.
Despite this, Pakistan is widely considered an ally in the war on terror, although
many Americans have blamed the resurgence of al Qaeda and Taliban forces on
Pakistan’s lackluster efforts. While some argue making continued aid conditional
on Pakistan’s performance, others believe convincing Pakistani officials that
defeating terrorism is in their own best interest is the most effective way to use
this ally.57
As Perl points out, The Report seemed to reach the conclusion that it may
not be feasible to deny terrorists funding in any meaningful sense.58 Though one
might view this as a step forward, Perl describes this conclusion as a key
shortcoming of The Report. He believes The Report overlooked a crucial detail—
that although dollar amounts seized may be smaller, the ultimate impact is high
in that these funds are critical to the ultimate operation of terrorist
organizations.59 Perl refers to The Report as “nothing less than a policy
bombshell” for its failure to adequately assess the focus and effectiveness of our
strategy.60 In a 2004 article, writer Benjamin DeMott stated that: “The plain, sad
reality…is that The 9/11 Commission Report, despite the vast quantity of labor
behind it, is a cheat and a fraud…At the core of all these failures lies a deep
wariness of earnest, well‐informed public debate.”61
In closing, Perl advocates implementing clear ways to measure our
success in this area. He believes we must first establish attainable goals and then
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measure the success with these goals in mind.62 Perl also offers a number of
policy options. One proposal includes a strategy focused on the demand driving
the money, rather than simply on the money alone. This proposal views
terrorism as the product of an ideology that must be countered.63 Perl stresses
the importance of understanding the social and cultural values of other countries
in order to achieve maximum international cooperation.64 This point cannot be
overlooked. The ethnocentric tendencies of the U.S. as a whole have plagued us
in the eyes of fellow nations, and likely have caused much of the terrorist hatred
we battle currently.
A notable strength of Perl’s contribution is his effort to suggest practical
policy options for decision makers. Although they are quite broad, these
suggestions at least acknowledge that our current efforts must be adjusted in
order to achieve maximum efficiency. Perl makes an important point that U.S.
policymakers must target areas where gains can be made, cutting our losses in
areas with diminishing returns.65 He further urges striking a balance between the
pursuit of anti‐terrorism policies and the protection of civil liberties.66 It is no
secret that individual rights have already been eroded to a dangerous extent in
pursuit of homeland security.
2. U.S. and International Responses to Terrorist Financing (Anne
Clunan)
Clunan begins with a discussion of CTF regimes within the framework of a
collective action problem. She notes that while most states would benefit from
limiting terrorist finances, there is an incentive to pass the costs of these efforts
on to others when the benefits outweigh the costs.67 Further, Clunan identifies
how the U.S. effort has been undermined by competing interests within its own
government.68 As the figurehead of the war on terror, the inability—and, quite
possibly, the indifference—of the U.S. to combat the problem leaves little reason
to expect other states to do so.69 Clunan’s main argument is that the U.S. is not
doing enough to create international cooperation, which Clunan describes as a
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“classic collective action problem.”70 This failure is the result of cognitive
dissonance associated with the passage of time. The main impetus for states to
implement CTF norms has not been U.S. pressure but the immediate need to
prevent terrorist attacks domestically.71 We cannot expect others to cooperate if
they do not recognize the necessity of doing so.
According to Clunan, there appears to be agreement among the U.S.
political elite that cooperation on a multilateral level is fruitless.72 U.S. officials
have determined that foreign governments do not view combating terrorist
financing as their problem.73 Likewise, although U.S. agencies agreed to
interagency cooperation immediately following 9/11, the passage of time has
eroded the political will to put the national interest ahead of private interests.74
Officials worry that CTF no longer represents a top priority at higher levels of
government.75 The U.S. domestic approach has transformed since the period
immediately following 9/11. U.S. international efforts now focus on intelligence
sharing with a small number of states using bilateral pressure rather than
funding a global multilateral regime.76
Clunan concludes by underscoring an unfortunate reality, which is that
redefining the national interest to include CTF appears directly correlated with
states’ personal experience with terrorism.77 Accordingly, as time passes, the
reality of terrorism becomes less tangible, causing other nations to back away
from their efforts to combat terrorism financing. Clunan makes an excellent
point: with time we tend to cast aside things which we once deemed paramount.
As we approach the 10 year anniversary of 9/11, the lack of any significant
domestic threat since that time78 has caused U.S. policy makers to focus on other
efforts. A direct corollary has been the diminished importance of our counter‐
terrorism efforts. In the weeks after 9/11, then‐President George W. Bush stated
that “We will direct every resource at our command to win the war against
70
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terrorists…” The immediacy of this threat appears to have weakened with the
passage of time. Not only have U.S. efforts eroded, but the international interest
in CTF appears to be dwindling as well. This point is corroborated by others in
the field who view this as a fundamental reason for waning international
support.79
Clunan’s contribution is significant for its recognition that while the U.S.
realizes the need to pursue an intelligence‐based strategy involving international
cooperation, we have essentially failed in this endeavor. We continue to focus
our efforts in the wrong areas instead of cooperating with our allies and
fostering an international recognition of the need to make CTF a priority. Clunan
echoes her fellow contributors by stressing the need for international
cooperation. However, she is unique in her identification of the ways in which
the U.S. has been counterproductive by failing to adhere to its stated agenda.
For example, she highlights how in the weeks following 9/11 the UN Security
Council passed a U.S.‐sponsored resolution (Resolution 1373) obligating
members to take measures to suppress terrorism financing.80 However, the only
incentive offered by Resolution 1373 was technical assistance, of which only $20
million was spent by the U.S. in the six years following the resolution’s
inception.81 For some perspective, the U.S. contributed less than 10 percent to
the UN during that period, versus more than half from Austria.82
Clunan leads the reader to the proposition that the U.S.—despite its
alleged intent—has failed itself. The global war on terrorism financing is largely a
creation of the U.S. war on terror in the aftermath of 9/11, meaning the U.S. has
been at the core of this pursuit. The United Nations appears to be our best hope
of attaining the “international cooperation” necessary to make real, tangible
progress, yet we continue to negate UN efforts. It is not imprudent to call our
actions over the last decade hypocritical. While we have maintained the notion
that transnational collaboration is crucial, we have not made the requisite effort,
namely financially, to combat terrorism finances.
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3. Terrorist Financing: Explaining Government Responses
(Giraldo and Trinkunas)

The closing piece brings readers full circle. The editors of State
Responses, who opened the book with a broad overview of the threat, provide
an explanation of government responses. They argue that the most important
source of divergence in government responses is domestic factors.83 As they
explain, although the current CTF regime encourages states to confront the
threat, this result is dependent upon domestic factors that ultimately determine
the degree to which a country participates effectively in the overall scheme.84
Giraldo and Trinkunas underline a major encumbrance to the regime’s
success, which is the sheer deficiency in the financial resources necessary to
implement an effective plan. The lack of adequate funding means many states
have not yet established the costly mechanisms required to effectively track
terrorist finances.85 They point out that the ultimate decision regarding
compliance with an international CTF regime depends on how governments
appraise the costs and benefits of these policies.86 This assessment is controlled
by external factors such as U.S. incentives for cooperation and public sentiment
against U.S. policies which often circumvent necessary legal requirements.87
These arguments echo Clunan, who also believes the onus is on the U.S. to
stimulate meaningful cooperation. Even more challenging is the realization that
CTF policies intrinsically provoke greater levels of domestic resistance in
comparison to other counter‐terrorism policies.88 As a consequence, any growth
in international cooperation must be spurned by supplying the funds necessary
to implement these strategies as well as measures to ensure our money is spent
properly.
An evaluation of the effectiveness of CTF policies post‐9/11 leads the
authors to suggest an increased focus on an intelligence‐based approach—a shift
recommended by others throughout State Responses. While this shift has
occurred to some degree, the effectiveness of such an approach is difficult to
measure. Furthermore, the U.S. government has taken the position that CTF
efforts have made terrorist financing “riskier, more costly, and more time‐
consuming.”89 However, the article points out that the real question is one of
83
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measuring the degree of effectiveness, rather than a quantitative measurement
based on assets seized.90 In short, we have certainly disrupted terrorist financing
efforts, but was it worth it?
In response to this question critics point to terrorists’ adaptability as
proof of the futility of the CTF regime; proponents see it as evidence of the
efficacy of existing policies.91 The problem lies in the inability to devise useful
“measures of effectiveness.”92 Thus, while the benefits of CTF policies are
difficult to assess, the costs resulting from defective efforts are more easily
measured by gauging public reactions to these efforts.93 The best way to ensure
positive sentiment is to avoid undermining individual rights in our pursuit of
asset seizures. The past has seen public sentiment tarnished by administrative
procedures that require lower standards of proof and offer little recourse to its
targets. Governments can ill‐afford to continue down this path.
Analogous to their initial argument, Giraldo and Trinkunas cite the
adaptability of terrorist organizations as the basis for the recent trend in attacks
which are both more frequent and lethal in nature.94 This problem is
compounded by the failure to attain meaningful international and interagency
cooperation.95 They offer possible solutions to these problems: the U.S. should
assume a greater burden to incentivize multilateral cooperation, work more
closely with other countries to establish workable policies, and implement an
intelligence‐based approach.96
The final piece is a satisfactory complement to the contributions which
precede it, yet its value is dependent on the viability of its recommendations
going forward. Thus, the book closes strongly by leaving the reader with tangible
recommendations. However, the preceding articles make it readily apparent that
the feasibility of these measures depends on the U.S. government’s willingness
and ability to outlay significant amounts of cash. Such a request seems unlikely
given the state of our current economy and the ongoing priority of controlling
the budget deficit.97 Although it is clear what needs to be done, U.S. CTF
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expenditures over the last decade make it clear that we are nowhere near the
level of commitment required to realize these objectives.
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
This Review would not be complete without an assessment of State
Responses from a legal standpoint. Unfortunately, although contributors cite
human rights infringement as a major obstacle to both domestic and
international cooperation, the authors fail to go beyond a mere statement of the
problem. Given the book’s focus on government responses, and the six‐year
removal of 9/11 at publication, the absence of this assessment is perplexing. If
the book seeks to fully appraise government responses to terrorism, an
evaluation of the consequences of these policies—such as their affect on civil
liberties—must flow from this investigation. The absence of this analysis makes it
necessary to briefly highlight but a few of these legal debates, some of which
apply broadly to the war on terror but nonetheless have affected the efficacy of
counter‐terrorism as a whole, including the CTF regime.
It is no secret that the U.S. counter‐terrorism agenda has had the
unintended consequence of undermining the war on terror. A major debate in
this area involves the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. With respect
to non‐U.S. citizens, the debate was spurned by President Bush’s detention of
persons in situations where there is “reason to believe” a connection to terrorist
activity exists.98 Moreover, the problem is exacerbated by the refusal to allow
detainees to challenge the legality of the arrests.99 Proponents defend the order
on the grounds that it applies only to non‐citizens; critics argue that this
procedure patently defeats the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of
its alleged targets.100
Domestically, we can look to the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act101 (hereinafter
“Patriot Act”) as a source of heated debate. Unlike the detainee process
described above, the Patriot Act is written in such a way as to mandate approval
by the judiciary.102 Similar to other government policies in the wake of 9/11,
officials appear to be bypassing fundamental legal prerequisites. In short, the
98
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U.S. government passed the Patriot Act as a means to do virtually whatever they
so chose in the name of fighting terrorism. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. A
major discord involves the broad‐sweeping measures of the Patriot Act. It
applies not only to proven terrorists, but also to suspected terrorists and law‐
abiding citizens alike. Again, the Patriot Act ushers in debate on Fourth
Amendment formalities. Namely, the immigration provisions, which allow for the
indefinite detention of any alien whom the Attorney General suspects of possible
terrorist involvement, and the expanded definition of “terrorism” to include
domestic terrorism.103
Constitutional issues surround the debate on counter‐terrorism policies
generally. More specific to CTF regimes, however, we see a tradeoff between
privacy rights and the public’s right to disclosure of these initiatives. Critics have
questioned government’s insistence on maintaining the secrecy of these
measures, further raising eyebrows concerning the legitimacy of these actions.104
One example is the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), which allows
access to international bank databases. While the TFTP has led to many arrests,
concerns have been raised about potential violations of financial privacy laws.105
The TFTP is likened to the NSA wiretapping controversy, which authorized the
warrantless monitoring of communications within U.S. borders as part of Bush’s
“terrorist surveillance program”.106 The underlying skepticism surrounding these
programs is that they have been initiated in the absence of public approval
and/or knowledge.
These are but a few of the vast number of issues in this area, but they all
seemingly point to the same general conclusion: U.S. counter‐terrorism policies
have been implemented in a manner which has caused a great divide in public
sentiment. Domestically, citizens question the government’s ability to implement
measures in the name of national security which bypass Constitutionally‐
protected rights. Internationally, states question the U.S insistence on receiving
more than we are willing to give in return. All in all, it becomes evident that
cooperation on the CTF front has suffered from a lack of legal credibility.
Onlookers are given the perception that the U.S. government believes the
benefits of evading legal requisites outweigh the concomitant costs.
Unfortunately, the deterioration of international cooperation proves the
consequences of such legal circumvention have been grossly underestimated.
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V. CONCLUSION

State Responses stands for the proposition that while much is known
about the history of anti‐terrorism financing efforts, we know little about the
effectiveness of these efforts, and even less about the future significance of
these efforts. State Responses is nothing short of incredibly informative. It sheds
light on a fact which is little known by the American public as a whole: that
despite the alleged importance of the “war on terror,” the U.S. has balked at the
steps necessary to yield results on a grand scale. The collaborative effort of State
Responses leads the reader to the stark realization that any attempt to
completely rid the world of terrorism is futile. Moreover, although the global
effort has brought about considerable results, only one thing is capable of
creating any considerable increase in international cooperation: the proliferation
of terrorist attacks on a global scale.
State Responses contributes to the growing scholarly debate on counter‐
terrorist financing measures by providing a thorough history of terrorism
financing, including highlighting current policy debates and obstacles in the
global effort to coordinate counter‐terrorism finance policy. By endeavoring to
explain the problem from various perspectives, Giraldo and Trinkunas succeed in
enabling the reader to fully grasp the internal dynamic of funding networks
within terrorist organizations. Further, the reader is given a detailed explanation
of the reasons behind policy success and, more appropriately, policy failure.
However, as a consequence of limiting its assessment to historical and
comparative perspectives, the book does little to address the significance of this
knowledge going forward. As such, the book serves as a credible resource on
contemporary terrorist finance, but falls short of any attempt to meaningfully
advance the scholarly debate. While this compilation of expert contributions
provides an excellent history of terrorism financing for the lay person, it leaves
something to be desired for anyone seeking to proactively shape the future of
U.S. policy in this area. The nature of the issue calls for a deeper discussion of
the future consequences of these government responses, and while the author
does not endeavor to broach this topic, this oversight may be the book’s one
shortcoming. This aside, State Responses does a commendable job
accomplishing its professed purpose, which is to provide a theoretical overview
of the terrorist threat and to assess state responses to the threat within the
context of counter‐terrorism financing.

